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TAX NEWS
MARY LANIGAR, C.P.A., Beverly Hills, California

FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS
The frequency with which published
court decisions have concerned family part
nerships within recent months indicates
that taxpayers resorted to the partnership
device to reduce surtaxes during the war
years to such an extent that even legitimate
arrangements have resulted in litigation.
The Lusthaus and Towers decisions of the
Supreme Court held that for Federal in
come tax purposes partnerships (including
those recognized by state law) may be dis
regarded if the evidence indicates that the
arrangements were not genuine and did not
result in a change in economic interest in
the business. Based upon these decisions,
LT. 3845 sets forth a Bureau policy of con
sidering the peculiar facts of each case as
evidenced by the terms of the agreement
and the conduct of the parties. The fol
lowing major criteria for determining the
effectiveness of such arrangements for in
come tax purposes were listed:
(1) The family member alleged to be a
partner must render services in the regu
lar conduct of the business to a degree and
of a quality ordinarily expected from a
partner in the type of business concerned.
(2) The partner must participate in the
control and management of the business.
Recent cases have ruled against the tax
payer where the partners were minor chil
dren or were limited in participation in
management by the partnership agreement.
(3) The partner’s capital should origi
nate with the contributor. In many family
partnerships the wife’s capital is derived
from a gift from the husband or from a
loan to be repaid from profits. While these
conditions alone do not determine that the
partnership is not bona fide, they are evi
dence unfavorable to the taxpayer. Con
tribution of separate funds of the wife at
a time when the business required addi
tional cash and could not obtain it elsewhere
would be evidence favoring the taxpayer.
(4) The last consideration is the reason
ableness of the proportion of profits which
a partner receives considered with respect
to the value of the services rendered and
the capital invested.
The numerous Tax Court decisions
handed down in 1947 have not departed
from these general principles, but some of
these cases are of interest because of their
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particular factual situations. In the
Schrecher case, to which the Commissioner
has acquiesced, the partnership was not
recognized for tax purposes and the wives’
partnership profits were withdrawn and
invested in real estate which was rented to
the partnership. The Tax Court held that
the profits received by the wives but taxed
to the husbands were the same as outright
gifts to the wives, and that the rent from
the real estate purchased with these profits
was the separate income of the wives.
DEDUCTION FOR ACCRUED TAXES
In The Baltimore Transfer Co. case (8
TC No. 1) the taxpayer computed and
accrued its 1943 liability for Maryland
unemployment compensation at a rate cor
responding to a notice from a State Admin
istrative Board. After the Federal income
tax return had been filed and the State tax
had been paid, the corporation was notified
that its rate had been reduced and was
credited with the overpayment. The Tax
Court held that the total amount accrued
was deductible in 1943. Under the tax bene
fit rule a refund or credit received in the
following year would be taxable if the de
duction resulted in a tax benefit.
I.T. 3849 concerning accrual of New
York franchise tax in 1945 follows the same
line of reasoning as the case discussed
above. The New York State franchise tax
accrues on the first day of a corporation’s
fiscal year. On March 12, 1946 the rate
was reduced from 6% to 4.5% for taxable
years ending after June 30, 1945. In the
case of corporations using the accrual
method of accounting, tax returns for fiscal
years ended July 31, 1945 to November 30,
1945 would presumably have been filed and
franchise tax deductions at the 6% rate
would have been claimed. A previous rul
ing (I.T. 3813) held that such corporations
should file amended Federal returns. I.T.
3849 modifies I.T. 3813 and states that
corporations accruing the deduction at the
rate of 6% for years ended December 31,
1945 and prior thereto will be allowed the
New York State franchise tax deduction as
claimed. The excess accrual (the difference
between 6% and 4.5%) will be income in
the following year.
The principle followed by both the Tax
Court and this Bureau ruling is that deduc

tions for accrued State or local taxes which
are based upon rates and other information
available to taxpayer when closing its books
should not be disturbed. Refunds due to
retroactive changes in rates or subsequent
rulings are income in a later year rather
than adjustments of the accrued amounts.

TAXABLE STOCK RIGHTS
The U. S. Supreme Court has held that a
distribution by a corporation to its share
holders in its stock or in rights to acquire
its stock does not constitute income if the
proportionate interests of stockholders are
not changed by the distribution. For ex
ample, subscription warrants for second
preferred stock distributed to common
stockholders but not to first preferred stock
holders would be taxable. Previous rulings
have held that taxable stock rights consti
tuted income when received and that the
fair market value at the date received was
the basis for computing gain or loss when
rights were sold. A new ruling (G.C.M.
25063) has held that no income is realized
until the rights are sold. Several court
cases are cited to support this interpreta
tion. It further states that no deductible
loss is sustained if rights are allowed to
expire. Section 117 (g) (2) of the Code,
which provides that gains or losses attribu
table to the failure to exercise options to
buy or sell property are to be considered as
short term capital gains or losses, is dis
tinguished as being applicable only when
the option was acquired for a considera
tion.
One of the principles set forth in G.C.M.
25063 may result in considerable litigation.
While several rulings are cited to support
the opinion that the entire amount received
upon the sale of taxable stock rights con
stitutes ordinary income, this principle has
not been generally accepted heretofore. The
line of reasoning followed is that rights
are in lieu of dividend income and therefore
do not constitute capital gain.
REINVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS OF
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION
To avoid undue hardship the Internal
Revenue Code provides that gain from in
voluntary conversion of property (destruc
tion by fire or flood or seizure by condem
nation) will not be recognized if the pro
ceeds are reinvested in similar property.
Such gains are recognized unless the tax
payer elects to benefit under the involuntary
conversion section of the law (Sec. 112(f)),
and taxpayers who have so elected must
comply fully with the regulations. These
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provisions deal only with gain as a loss is
fully recognized in any event. The gain is
the excess of the insurance proceeds or con
demnation award over the adjusted basis
of the property.
The law provides that the proceeds must
be used forthwith to acquire similar prop
erty. The use of the term “forthwith” in
the statute implies that the replacement
will be within a reasonable time under the
circumstances. A number of court cases
have arisen on the point of time for replace
ment. If it is not practical to replace imme
diately (because of priorities, for example),
the taxpayer may establish a replacement
fund with the approval of the Commis
sioner. The regulations specify the form
to be used to apply for establishment of a
replacement fund and provide that a bond
will be required if permission is obtained.
The property acquired with the proceeds
of the involuntary conversion must be simi
lar in use to the property seized or de
stroyed. The regulations cite use of pro
ceeds from requisition of tugs to buy bar
ges and investment of proceeds from con
demned unimproved land in improved real
estate as examples of investments which
are not similar in character. The property
acquired assumes the same basis for tax
purposes as the property destroyed. If a
taxpayer elects to report $100,000 fire in
surance proceeds from a building with a
$50,000 basis as an involuntary conversion,
the second building acquired for $100,000
will also have a basis of $50,000. If he
purchases a replacement for $90,000, gain
of $10,000 will be recognized.
The regulations state that it is not suffi
cient for a taxpayer to show that subse
quent to the receipt of money from a con
demnation award he has purchased other
similar property. The taxpayer is required
to trace the proceeds of the award into the
payments for the second property. This
provision was very strictly interpreted in
the Kennebec Box and Lumber Co. case
(Memo TC). This taxpayer deposited all of
its fire insurance proceeds in a special bank
account. Before replacing the destroyed
property, the corporation withdrew ap
proximately $50,000 from this account
which it later replaced. The new property
was acquired from funds in the special bank
account (which then equaled the insurance
proceeds), but the court ruled that gain was
recognized because the amount of $50,000
(which had been withdrawn temporarily)
was not insurance proceeds invested in new
property.

